


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Intelligence Reporting Guide

AFRICA

~~Secret~~

IRG-Af-1972
15 Dec 72 - 14 Dec 73

WARNING

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973

FOREWORD

The Intelligence Reporting Guide (IRG) highlights longer range and continuing intelligence reporting needs believed to be obtainable from human source collectors. Although an effective means for making these needs known to a wide variety of sources, the IRG is not a mandatory collection document. As is the case with the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL), which details the analysts' shorter range intelligence needs, collectors should view this publication as complementary to any specific instructions they may receive from their respective collection managers.

Beginning with this issue, longer range and continuing economic guidance will be published separately in a publication to be known as the Economic Reporting Guide (ERG). The ERG is sponsored by the Economic Intelligence Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and contains selected longer range economic information needs of all participating members of the Washington economic community.

Topics of current intelligence interest will continue to appear in the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) and its new economic counterpart, the Economic Alert List (EAL). These triannual guidance publications for Africa are published on 15 February, 15 June, and 15 October.

In all of these documents, items have been classified separately and bear the classification (S) SECRET, (C) CONFIDENTIAL, or (U) UNCLASSIFIED followed, where appropriate, by the necessary control; i.e., NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

The IRG and its economic counterpart, the ERG, are produced by the Information Requirements Staff, DD/I, CIA, and are published annually on each of seven areas of the world. Collectors in the field are encouraged to cite the IRG and its companion volumes when reporting is responsive to questions contained in these guidance documents. Comments and suggestions are encouraged and should be directed to:

Human Resources Group, IRS/CIA, Room 2G40
CIA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.
Code 143, Extension 5577 or 5578

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

HIJACKING

1. Report on specific dangers posed to US airlines, on attitudes of host governments to US proposals for international action, and on any incidents even though they do not involve US aircraft or US citizens. There is always US public interest in any hijacking or aircraft terrorist incident; also, there is a surprising degree of interconnection between the occurrence of such incidents in one part of the world and another. Therefore, posts should seek from any available sources immediate details on such incidents and should follow up with reports on the disposition of the hijackers, including dates of trial, sentencing, release from prison, etc. (U)

COMMUNIST CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

New Communist Chinese aid programs in African countries probably will include underground water, road, and geological-geophysical surveys. The Chinese recently have completed cooperative agreements involving such surveys in other areas and may soon initiate new operations in Africa. They have long been involved in these activities in Tanzania and Zambia where unconfirmed rumors of Chinese missile-space tracking facilities have been reported. Other Chinese projects--the construction of a naval base in Dar es Salaam, airfield surveys, and possible radar sites--could support future Chinese missile-space activities. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

1. Furnish details of current or planned Chinese survey and construction assistance in Africa, including location and nature of the teams; Chinese names, specialities, and affiliation; methods and instruments used; stated purpose; and construction, descriptions, and specifications. (S)

2. Report activities of Chinese ships visiting Africa or offshore islands, especially Tanzania, including name, size, cargo, personnel, electronics, and places visited. (S)

3. Provide information on possible Chinese attempts or successes in obtaining rights to construct radar, optical, communication, or other facilities in or near Africa. (S)

4. Continue detailed reporting of Chinese or Soviet activities at the National and Aeronautics Space Administration's old Mercury tracking sites on Zanzibar. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

COMMUNIST CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (Continued)

5. Continue detailed reporting on the possible Chinese radar sites, especially at Wazo Hill, near Dar es Salaam. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

6. Report on electronic, optic, or other unusual equipment associated with Chinese Embassies or buildings in Africa. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

7. Report on Chinese scientific and technical delegations visiting African countries, including names, specialities, affiliations, and other activities. (C)

8. Provide photographs on the above questions when at all possible. (C)

SOVIET SPACE TRACKING FACILITIES IN AFRICA

The USSR for the last several years has been working toward establishing a worldwide network of optical satellite tracking stations. Both overt and clandestine means are being used to obtain precise geodetic-gravimetric data which could be used to verify their existing geodetic information and to possibly improve their intercontinental ballistic missile targeting. (C)

In Africa, the Soviets have established overt optical satellite tracking stations in Cairo (Arab Republic of Egypt), Khartoum (Sudan), Fort Lamy (Chad), and Afgoi (Somali Democratic Republic). (C)

1. Where are the Soviets negotiating for the establishment of optical satellite tracking stations? What is the status of negotiations for each site? What tracking camera will be used? Describe related equipment at the station? (C)

2. Is there any evidence that the Soviets are using lasers at any of the established tracking stations? (C)

3. What satellites are being observed and for what purpose (geodesy, gravimetry, atmospheric density determinations, etc.)? (C)

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SOVIET SPACE TRACKING FACILITIES IN AFRICA (Continued)

4. Obtain names and affiliations of Soviet and indigenous scientists and engineers associated with the establishment and operation of the various tracking sites. (C)

HEALTH

A. Key Personalities

1. Request information on the health of key personalities in Africa to include chiefs of state, heirs apparent, and the important civilian and military leaders who have influence on the domestic, foreign, and military policies of each country. In addition to general information which would reflect the state of health of the various individuals, reports should include, if possible, such information as personal observations, medical and laboratory reports, and reports of any significant changes in appearance and personality. (C)

B. Public Health Activities

The impact of endemic-epidemic diseases is becoming a significant factor in political, economic, and military affairs. Some diseases are important but have limited distribution, others have worldwide distribution, and still others threaten to become serious problems in terms of incidence and distribution. (U)

1. Provide information outlining the major disease and health problems. What is being done for their control, and what is planned? Report on new approaches and uncommon circumstances which influence their control, spread, and eradication. (U)

2. Furnish information reflecting views on the economic and political impact of disease problems. (U)

3. Report on the amount and effectiveness of foreign assistance programs, including those of the World Health Organization. (U)

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

HEALTH (Continued)

B. Public Health Activities (Continued)

4. Supply information on statistical treatment of incidence data showing cyclic patterns relating to time, weather conditions, and other environmental factors. (U)

5. What is the relative ratio between official disease incidence rates and actual numbers of cases? (C)

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ALGERIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

There is a long-term continuing need for information on the political dynamics of the country. (U)

1. How large is the Presidential staff? How is it organized? What interpersonal relationships contribute to its smooth operation, and vice versa? How does Prime Minister Boumediene use this staff? What degree of autonomy does it or its principal officials enjoy? (C)

2. What is the size and composition of the Council of the Revolution? How often does it meet? What is the extent of its influence? (C)

3. How much authority does Boumediene delegate to his Council of Ministers? Intraministerial friction has been reported. Do other ministers tend to ally themselves in factions, or are the feuding ministers isolated? What is the familial and tribal background of the ministers? (C)

4. What interministerial or other permanent or ad hoc advisory groups have been created by Boumediene? What are the functions of these bodies? How much influence do they wield? (C)

5. What is the approximate membership of the National Liberation Front (FLN)? What are the qualifications for membership? How are members recruited? Are local, regional, and national officials required to be at least nominal members to hold their jobs? How does party-governmental liaison operate? (C)

6. Who are and where are the active political opponents of Boumediene? How are their activities financed? What is the source of their support? What are their objectives? (S)

7. What is the composition of the National Economic and Social Council? How often does it meet? What is the extent of its influence on internal policy? (C)

8. What is the status of the various national organizations that theoretically are subordinate to the FLN--

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ALGERIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

labor, students, women, youth, etc.? (U) How are these groups organized? How are members recruited? What policies do they pursue? What activities are they engaged in? (C)

9. What religious groups exist? How do they influence the regime? (C)

10. How much direct control does the Government exercise over the public affairs media? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Since Algeria is the pivotal country with respect to Maghrebian affairs, its attitude toward Maghreb-wide projects therefore are of much interest. What is Algeria's attitude toward the Permanent Secretariat of the Maghreb, which it chairs, but which is located in Tunis? What personnel does it furnish the secretariat? (C)

2. Algeria's bilateral relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and the Arab Republic of Egypt are of particular importance. How are these relations evolving? (C)

3. Algeria seems to have revised its policy of assistance to liberation groups. What specific aid does Algeria supply to each such group? (C)

4. Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe seem to have a lower priority than those with Europe. What, if any, specific steps is Algeria taking to reduce the Soviet and East European presence in Algeria? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. What are the precise functions of the commanders of the five military regions? What authority do they exercise over troops assigned to their areas? (S)

2. What is the line of command from Boumediene to brigade or lower unit? (S)

3. Now that universal military training is well underway, what plans are being made to provide for, equip, and train a military reserve? (S)

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ALGERIA

MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)

4. How many Soviet and other military advisers remain in the country? Where are they located? With what service or unit are they associated? Do such advisers exert any political influence over the units with which they are associated? (S)

5. What military assistance--equipment and/or training--is the Algerian military supplying to foreign liberation groups? What are the conditions of such assistance? (S)

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ANGOLA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

We appreciate the high level of current reporting maintained in spite of the difficulties in obtaining accurate information. (C)

1. What are the plans, sources of aid, size of membership and field strength, and rivalries among and within the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Angolan Revolutionary Government-in-exile (GRAE), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? (C)

2. In what areas of Angola do the insurgents operate? Which group is responsible for how much insurgent activity within each area? What is the attitude of the local population in such areas? What tribal groups cooperate with or oppose each rebel group? (C)

3. How much and what kinds of assistance per annum is Moscow giving the MPLA? Is Peking giving any significant assistance to the MPLA? (C)

4. The implementing statute that defines Angola's relationship with Lisbon should be promulgated in early 1973. Does the statute alter in any way Lisbon's fundamental control of Angolan affairs? Does it provide for the decentralization of administrative and financial decisionmaking without altering the basic political relationship? Are officials in Angola taking advantage of the statute to foster greater local responsibility? (C)

5. How are local administrations implementing Lisbon's policies aimed at improving the lot of the Africans? What is the status of the expanded social, educational, and economic programs for the Africans? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Have Kinshasa and Lusaka taken any steps to restrict nationalist activities in view of Portuguese political leverage that threatens the use of access routes vital to the Zairian and Zambian economies? If so, how are such restrictions enforced? (S)

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ANGOLA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. What is the degree of Portuguese cooperation with the Zaire Republic? What are Portuguese plans for increasing their representation and activity in Kinshasa? (S)

3. What subversive intentions and plans do the Portuguese have regarding Angola's neighbors? Who are involved, and what kind of training and equipment is involved? What is local official thinking on "hot pursuit" raids or other punitive incursions into Zambia? (S)

4. What is the extent of cooperation with Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa? How much support has South Africa furnished for the Portuguese counterinsurgency effort? (S)

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BOTSWANA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

President Sir Seretse Khama's Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) came to power in 1965, a year before the former protectorate of Bechuanaland received independence from the United Kingdom. The BDP was returned to power with a slightly reduced majority in 1969. Although Khama is the de facto chief of the country's largest tribe and his party relies mainly on the traditional tribal structure, Khama has striven to give his government a modern political and administrative structure. The BDP is opposed by three weak and factional groups. Because the economy is poor and dependent upon the Republic of South Africa, Khama has had to follow a policy of accommodation with Pretoria. Diamond, copper, manganese, salt, soda ash, coal, and nickel deposits have been discovered, which should make the economy viable sometime late in the 1970's. (U)

1. How effective is the Botswana Government in administration and in responsiveness to popular aspirations? How popular is the Government? (U)

2. Who are the potential successors to President Khama? Do factionalism and personal rivalries impair the effectiveness of the BDP or the Government? What is the current standing and effectiveness of Vice President Masire? (C)

3. Are there any significant changes in the objectives and activities, particularly subversive activities, of the various opposition parties? (C)

4. Continue reporting on problems relating to the construction of the Bot-Zam Road, including the border question and Zambian cooperation; Botswana attitudes toward regional cooperation, especially with regard to such institutions as the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) and the Regional Testing Center; and Rhodesian sanctions problems. (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What is Botswana's policy on dialog with the Republic of South Africa? How effective is the Botswana Government in convincing other African governments that its present ties with South Africa do not constitute dialog? What are the political implications of the Rhodesian railroad that runs through Botswana to South Africa? (C)

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BOTSWANA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. To what degree do South African, South-West African, and Rhodesian subversives use Botswana as a haven and way station? How much material and money pass through the country, and who are the sources and end users? How much does Botswana cooperate with South Africa and Rhodesia in dealing with guerrillas? (S)

3. How extensive are the operations of South African and Rhodesian intelligence and security agencies in Botswana? (S)

4. In what ways are Zambian-Botswana relations improving? What are the political implications of the Nata-Kazungula Road, increasing trade, etc.? Are there any understandings between Botswana and Zambia on the control of southern African subversives? (S)

5. Are there any new developments in the dispute over where the borders of Botswana, Zambia, Rhodesia, and the Caprivi Strip come together? (C)

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REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Following the violence of the summer of 1972, what is the Government doing, and planning to do, in order to rebuild? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. Political factionalism has always been strong in Burundi. How has this factionalism been exacerbated by the events of last summer? Are there any signs of potentially open opposition to President Micombero by ousted Tutsi extremists? Are there any signs of a potential Hutu opposition? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. On at least two occasions within the past year or so, the Government has alluded to the possibility of planning a new Constitution and preparing for national elections. What steps are being taken toward these goals? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

4. What election role is likely to be played by the National Party of Unity and Progress (UPRONA) and its youth wing, the JRR? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Relations with Belgium have been strained since the summer of 1972. What are the two sides doing to ease relations? How has the Belgian presence in Burundi been affected by last summer's violence? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. How are relations with the Hutu government of Rwanda being affected by last summer's violence? Is the Burundian Government contemplating any actions against Rwanda beyond verbal attacks? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. What is the status of the Chinese presence in Burundi? Are the Chinese maintaining any contacts with governmental or party figures or ousted politicians? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

4. Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko apparently has cooled toward President Micombero since last summer because of the violence in Burundi. What is Micombero doing to improve relations with Zaire? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The army long has reflected the political factionalism rife within the Burundian Government. How is the army likely to develop in the wake of its role in the violence of last summer? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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CAMEROON

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. President Ahidjo is trying to revitalize the Cameroonian National Union (UNC) party by expanding membership, strengthening organization, and finding competent leaders. It would be helpful to us if an annual progress report on the UNC is prepared. (C)
2. In May 1972, Cameroon, which joins French-speaking East Cameroon and English-speaking West Cameroon, was transformed from a federal to a unitary republic. We would appreciate a quarterly review of the ongoing governmental and legal changes caused by this constitutional change-over. (C)
3. A nationwide trade union confederation is being gradually forged by the Cameroonian Government. Can a yearend wrap-up of the labor unification effort be forwarded? (C)
4. The revolutionary Cameroon People's Union (UPC), though dying, is not entirely extinguished yet. If possible, furnish a year by year assessment of the UPC's activities and leadership, both in Cameroon and abroad. (S)
5. Popular dissatisfaction with the Ahidjo regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among Cameroon's various regional, tribal, and special interest groups be evaluated annually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The annual review of Cameroon's relations with Communist countries is very helpful. Could this review be broadened along the same format to include Cameroon's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
2. Cameroon is among those French client states which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords with Paris. Provide reporting as developments occur regarding the changes sought by Cameroon and the status of negotiations with France. (C)

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CAMEROON

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Cameroon. Would it be possible to treat Cameroon's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)

2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of personnel changes in the various Cameroonian security and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Central African Republic is dominated by the impulsive and suspicious President Bokassa, a widely feared military strong man who seized power in 1966. Pre-occupied with internal security, he has suppressed all political institutions and political activity. (C)

1. Popular dissatisfaction with the Bokassa regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among the Central African Republic's various tribes and special interests (particularly the military) be evaluated annually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The annual review of the Central African Republic's relations with Communist countries is very helpful. Could this review be broadened along the same format to include the Central African Republic's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Communities, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports are generally adequate to cover our long-range military reporting needs for the Central African Republic. Would it be possible to treat the Central African Republic's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)

2. We have no reliable way for keeping abreast of personnel changes in the various Central African security and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

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CHAD

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. President Tombalbaye is trying to correct the administrative abuses and lack of social services that have contributed to Chad's 7-year-old Muslim insurgency. Can a yearly overview of these efforts be forwarded? (C)

2. The two principal Muslim exile groups in opposition to the Chadian Government are the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINA) and the Chad Liberation Front (FLT). Can an annual assessment of their threat in terms of leadership, organization, activities, and foreign support be provided? (S)

3. The monthly situation reports of the Muslim rebellion by region and prefecture are very useful. Continue such reporting, with ongoing attention to Libyan aid to the rebels, Sudanese counterinsurgent cooperation with Chad, and French military aid for Chad. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The annual review of Chad's relations with Communist countries is very helpful. Could this review be broadened along the same format to include Chad's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Communities, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Chad. Would it be possible to treat Chad's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)

2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of personnel changes in the various Chadian security and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

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CONGO

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. There is an ongoing struggle for power between President Ngouabi and his northern tribal supporters on the one hand and southern tribal and radical elements on the other. Can a biannual assessment be made of who appears to have the upper hand? (S)

2. President Ngouabi is striving to revitalize the Congolese Workers Party (PCT) in order to make it an effective instrument for reducing French influence by careful degrees and for implementing a gradual program of "socialism." A yearend wrap-up of the PCT's leadership, organization, and activities would be appreciated. (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Can the apparently suspended annual review of the Congo's relations with Communist countries be renewed? Could this review be broadened along the same format to include the Congo's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and such organizations as the United Nations, European Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)

2. The Congo is among those French client states which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords with Paris. Reporting is desired as developments occur regarding the changes sought by the Congo and the status of negotiations with France. (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for the Congo. Would it be possible to treat the Congo's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)

2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of personnel changes in the various Congolese security and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

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DAHOMAY

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A military junta composed of junior officers ousted the civilian three-man Presidential Council in October 1972 with promises to end governmental corruption and cure Dahomey's economic ills. (U)

1. What is the new Government doing to fulfill its promises to end corruption and get the economy moving? (C)

2. Who are the strong men within the new regime? Is there any challenge to the new President, Major Kerekou, from within his own government? (S)

3. Are there indications of continued plotting by the senior military officers who were left out of this coup, by former civilian politicians, or by other disgruntled segments of society? (C)

4. What is the ideological complexion of the new regime likely to be? Several members of the new Cabinet reportedly are leftist. Are these members sufficiently strong to influence others, or are they likely to be isolated? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Is the new Government likely to recognize Peking and other Communist countries? (C)

2. Is there any change in overall foreign policy foreseeable? (C)

3. Is the new Government likely to view its relations with its regional neighbors differently? Is the military government likely to become closer to the anglophone military regimes of Ghana and Nigeria at the expense of relations with francophone civilian regimes like Niger and the Ivory Coast? (C)

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S E C R E T

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Popular dissatisfaction is known to exist with the erratic and forceful President Macias, but it is difficult for us to gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among Equatorial Guinea's tribal and special interest groups be evaluated semiannually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)

2. President Macias seems to be forging his single National Unity Party of Workers (PUNT) into an effective instrument for mobilizing mass support. Can a yearly progress report on PUNT's leadership, organization, and activities be submitted? (C)

3. President Macias' intimate associates are divided into a number of competing palace cliques. Can a quarterly assessment be made as to which factions appear to be ascendant? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The annual review of Equatorial Guinea's relations with Communist countries is very useful. Could this review be broadened along the same format to include Equatorial Guinea's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity? (C)

2. Equatorial Guinea is embroiled with Gabon in what promises to be a long-term dispute over the ownership of several tiny Atlantic Ocean islands in Corisco Bay. Report on the progress of efforts to resolve the dispute peacefully as developments occur. (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Equatorial Guinea. Would it be possible to treat Equatorial Guinea's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of personnel changes in the various Equatorial Guinean security services. Forward a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Africa IRG-Af-1972
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ETHIOPIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. According to the Constitution, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, the Emperor's oldest and sole surviving son, will become Emperor upon the death of Haile Selassie. Although the Emperor has designated Asfa Wossen as his official heir to the throne, he has given the Crown Prince little chance to demonstrate his capacity or gain experience in governmental affairs. Is there any evidence that this policy is changing and that the Emperor is permitting the Crown Prince a greater role in governmental matters? (C)

2. In succeeding to the throne, the Crown Prince reportedly would enjoy the support of key figures in the military, the nobility, and the church. Is there any indication that this situation has changed? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. Would the Crown Prince continue the conservative policies of his father, or would he attempt to quicken the pace of political and social reforms? Is he interested in seeing Ethiopia become a constitutional monarchy? (S)

4. The 10-year-old insurgency in Eritrea grinds on with no end in sight. Is there any evidence of resentment toward the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) among Eritreans? Is the ELF expanding its operations, or has it reached a peak? (S) Is the ELF making any progress in healing its internal divisions? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

5. Has Sudanese, Yemeni, and Chinese Communist support for the ELF been cut back? Where does the ELF get most of its support? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Is the Emperor interested in improving relations with the Somali Democratic Republic? (C)

2. Does the Emperor have some kind of an understanding with the French that they will not leave Djibouti without first insuring that Ethiopian interests in the territory will be preserved? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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ETHIOPIA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

3. During the Emperor's trip to the People's Republic of China in October 1971, an \$84 million aid agreement was signed providing for agricultural development and other projects. Is the Emperor satisfied with the implementation of the agreement? How many Chinese laborers or technicians will arrive in Ethiopia as a result of the agreement? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Is there any evidence that the territory is becoming an unacceptable burden to the French because of the continued closure of the Suez Canal? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

25X6

3. Are relations still relatively peaceful between the territory's Afar and Somali inhabitants? (S)

4. Is there any evidence that nationalist groups, such as the Liberation Front for the Somali Coast (supported by the Somali Democratic Republic) and the Djibouti Liberation Movement (backed by Ethiopia), are again becoming active? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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GABON

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Popular dissatisfaction with the Bongo regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among Gabon's various regional, tribal, and special interests be reviewed annually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)
2. There are indications that some of the Gabonese exiles who have rallied to the Bongo regime and serve it in a diplomatic capacity retain their opposition sentiments. We would appreciate a yearly assessment of the subversive attitudes and activities of Bongo's former enemies. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The annual review of Gabon's relations with Communist countries is very useful. Could this review be broadened along the same format to include Gabon's relations with Western nations, neighboring African states, and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
2. Gabon is among those French client states which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords with Paris. Reporting is desired as developments occur regarding the changes sought by Gabon and the status of negotiations with France. (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Gabon. Would it be possible to treat Gabon's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of personnel changes in the various Gabonese security and intelligence services. If possible, provide a quarterly listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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THE GAMBIA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. For a long time, there has been much talk of a Senegalese-Gambian union of some sort, but very little motion in this direction. Are there any indications that this is a serious consideration among Gambian politicians? Are there any practical steps short of full union that might be pursued by The Gambia? (C)

2. There is considerable smuggling of peanuts and other items between Senegal and The Gambia. What is the trend in this illegal trade? Are there any signs that it is changing? What is the Gambian Government's attitude toward smuggling, and what has it done to curtail it, if anything? (C)

3. Now that The Gambia has agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, what, if any, changes in Gambian foreign policy might result? Report any changes in the status of the Taiwanese agricultural and technical mission in The Gambia and any indications of local groups maintaining contacts with the Peking representatives. (C)

4. Since the Cabinet reshuffle to drop the Minister of Finance, what changes in the power structure have occurred? Are any other Cabinet-level officials in danger of being dropped? Are any other high-level officials involved in corruption; if so, which ones? (C)

S E C R E T


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GHANA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What is the decisionmaking process within the junta that has governed Ghana since the coup in January 1972? (C)
2. How effective is the administration? (C)
3. Which of Acheampong's military advisers have the most influence? What are their political and economic views? Are there any key figures within the civil service? (C)
4. Has the junta been gaining in experience and confidence since taking over, despite its fears of coup plots against it? (C)
5. What are the tribal divisions and tensions within the army and the Government? (C)
6. What political opposition elements could become a focus for discontent? (C)
7. What is going on at the local government level? (C)
8. What is the role of organized labor? Report on the unemployed and underemployed in Accra, Tema, and Takoradi; do they have identifiable leaders who might cause future trouble? (C)

25X6



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S E C R E T

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GUINEA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. In updating the National Intelligence Survey on Guinea during 1972, several areas where information gaps frequently occur were identified; they are structure and function of government (especially at the local level) and population, labor, health, and education statistics. Admittedly, basic information on Guinea is particularly difficult to acquire at this time, and reorganizations of political and economic structures are frequent and often meaningless. Reporting in these areas in whatever detail possible would be appreciated. (U)

2. During the 1971 purge, Toure claimed he would decentralize the Government. Have his various reorganizations had that effect? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Provide details about Soviet improvements on Conakry harbor carried out in connection with its Kindia project. Is there evidence that the improvements are designed also to service Soviet warships? Does Moscow want a Soviet naval base in Conakry as rumored or more regular use of port facilities by their navy? (S)

2. We believe Guinean police and security officials are advising the Sierra Leoneans. Provide any details. Are Guineans involved in Sierra Leone's militia training program? (S)

3. Provide as much detail as possible about any new security organizations created since the 1970 attack. Report on their lines of control, manpower, and roles. How have the other Guinean security services reacted to any new groups? (U)

4. Embezzlements of governmental funds, public disclosure of widespread corruption, grumbling associated with the currency reform, and defection of students and diplomatic representatives abroad are just a few signs of what appears to us to be a rather pervasive crumbling of morale in Guinea. How significant is the malaise, and does it present any real threat to Toure's position? Is the President held responsible by the people for the excesses and corruption of his subordinates? (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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IVORY COAST

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Under Houphouet-Boigny's paternal guidance and in close cooperation with France, the Ivory Coast has achieved political stability and considerable economic growth. (U)

1. Will this relatively happy situation continue should Houphouet leave the scene? (C)

2. Who will be his likely successor, and how will policies differ? Which potential successor appeals most to the younger generation? (C)

3. Are there any elements within the army that might become politically ambitious in a successive government? (C)

4. Has the Government-sponsored student association won significant support? (U)

5. Does the Government plan to go ahead with the Riviera project despite criticism by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. How far will Houphouet go in pursuing his policy of dialog with the Republic of South Africa? (C)

2. Has Houphouet's displeasure with the United States over coffee and cocoa commodity agreements caused any change in his overall attitude toward the United States? (C)

3. With other Entente members recognizing Communist regimes, is there any indication that Houphouet feels under pressure to do the same? (S)

4. Houphouet traditionally has opposed the linking of the francophone states with the anglophone states in economic unions. Does he still maintain this opposition; if so, how far would he be willing to go to keep Nigeria, Ghana, etc., out of budding economic groups like the West African Economic Community (CEAO)? (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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IVORY COAST

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

5. Are there any indications that Houphouet may be interested in renegotiating the basic accords with France as is Niger? Is there any pressure to do so from other members of the Government? (S)

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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KENYA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Kenya's most pressing and potentially dangerous problem is succession. President Kenyatta is about 80. Vice President Moi is Kenyatta's constitutional successor, at least for 90 days. Moi is nationally known, and, as a Kalenjin (one of a relatively unimportant minority tribe), he appears to be tribally acceptable to most Kenyans. However, growing public resentment over the increasing dominance of President Kenyatta's Kikuyu establishment, with which Moi is closely associated, insures a difficult period of intense political rivalry after Kenyatta's passing. How solid is Moi's support within the Kikuyu establishment? What support outside the establishment can Moi count on? What are the chances that he will be able to consolidate his position within the 90-day period during which parliamentary elections must be held? Who are the other most important contenders, and what are their chances? (C)

2. Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribesmen have been squabbling over land acquisition in the Rift Valley. How serious is the situation? Does it have any national political implications? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. Elections scheduled last March for the Kenyan African National Union, Kenya's only political party, were postponed and have yet to be rescheduled. The major reason for delay appears to be disunity among the Kikuyu. Can some light be shed on the reasons behind the squabbling? How do the Kikuyu split up--along northern, central, and southern innertribal lines or along pro- and anti-Government lines--or is there a mixture of both? Can members of the various factions be identified? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) How much support does J. M. Kariuki, a Kikuyu candidate for the succession who is anathema to Kenyatta, have in Kikuyu country? (C)

4. The political rivalry expected in the 90 days following Kenyatta's death will increase the chances of military intervention in the political process. Would such intervention occur primarily along tribal lines with officers interceding on behalf of their own tribal brethren, or would officers of varying tribal backgrounds move to support a leader who is less tribally minded than Kenyatta? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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KENYA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

25X6A

6. Despite events in Uganda, President Kenyatta is expected to maintain his policy of only very gradually replacing noncitizen Asians with Africans. A recent study recommended that he slow down gradual Africanization even further, for economic reasons. Report any indications of change in this basic policy. (C) Are Asians in Kenya sufficiently upset with events in Uganda to leave Kenya voluntarily in appreciable numbers? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Is President Kenyatta considering any change in his cautious approach to the USSR or the People's Republic of China? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. A period of ferment and shifting alignments in east Africa appear to be working to the disadvantage of Kenya and the East African Community. Should Uganda line up with the Somali Democratic Republic, what can Amin do to make life difficult for Kenya? Are there problems of disputed land or split tribes along the Kenya-Uganda border that could become serious? There are reportedly 300,000 Kenyan Africans in Uganda. Is this figure correct? Where in Uganda are they, how did they come to be there, and in what activities do they engage? What is the mood among the 300,000 Somalis in the northeastern corner of Kenya? Are the Kenyan Government's programs designed to improve their lives working? Is there much sentiment for joining the Somali Democratic Republic? Is the three-member East African Community likely to stop functioning in many areas? Will an effort be made to enlarge the membership? (C)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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LESOTHO

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The governing party in Lesotho, headed by Chief Leabua Jonathan, is maintaining numerous ties with the Republic of South Africa while, at the same time, defending itself against a radical opposition that occasionally criticizes Jonathan's domestic program and Pretoria's racial policies. During the 1970 elections, Chief Jonathan declared a state of emergency and, canceling the results of the election, began to rule by decree. The King, who supported the opposition, has been reduced in status and now reigns only as a constitutional monarch. Chief Jonathan is keenly aware that his country's political independence is encumbered by its desperate economic situation. Lesotho is appallingly poor and almost totally dependent on the Republic of South Africa for trade, transportation, services, and a market for its surplus labor. The country's prospects for eventually becoming self-supporting are very dim. (C)

1. What evidence is there that the delicate modus vivendi between Jonathan on the one hand and the King and opposition party leaders on the other will continue or fall apart in the near future? (C)

2. What are the activities, objectives, and popularity of the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)? What are the political implications of factional conflicts within the BCP? Does the BCP receive financial support from Communist countries? (C)

3. What are the stresses and strains, factional strife, etc., within the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP)? What is the national popularity of the party and key individual party leaders? (C)

4. Is there any evidence that the reportedly defunct Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) plans to try a comeback? (C)

5. What is the political significance of trade unions and other urban groups? What is their political allegiance? Are they well organized? (C)

6. How competent and loyal are the Basotho Police? To what extent are they tied to Chief Jonathan or to the South Africans? (C)

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LESOTHO

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

7. Continue reporting on Basotho attitudes toward regional cooperation, especially regarding the devolution of the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. (U)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What are the significant trends in Lesotho's relations with the Republic of South Africa? What is Lesotho's policy on dialog with Pretoria, and what is the impact of this policy on relations with white and black African states? (C)

2. What are the significant trends and developments in Lesotho's relations with the United Kingdom? (C)

3. Is Lesotho being used as a haven and way station for South African subversives? How much material and money pass through the territory, and who are the sources and end users in South Africa? (S)

4. How much cooperation is there between South African and Basotho security and police agencies? How much clandestine South African police and intelligence activity is there in Lesotho? (C)

5. Continue reporting on negotiations with South Africa on the Malibamatso Dam project. (U)

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LIBERIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Immediately following his succession to the Presidency, William R. Tolbert vowed to continue his predecessor's "unification" policy. Under Tubman, much was made of this policy, but there seemed to be few specific programs. Is Tolbert's vow mere propaganda, or has he inaugurated any programs to achieve this end? What are they? (U)

2. Information is needed on the operation of local government. Is it responsive to the needs of tribal people or just an instrument of control by the elite in Monrovia? How does the county superintendent system work? What is the source of its local budget? What is the process by which directives from Monrovia are transmitted? How do paramount chiefs fit into the local system? What is their relationship to the superintendent and to the Central Government? What is the attitude of tribal people toward the county superintendent system? How does the local court system operate? (U)

3. Liberia's only national census was taken in 1962. Are other more recent population figures available? Even partial surveys would be useful. (U)

4. How viable is the organization of the True Whig Party within the various counties? Is there anything like a local party organization? What changes has Tolbert made to bring the party under personal control? (U)

25X1X

Has Tolbert been as effective as Tubman in balancing the key families? What is the current political status of the Tubman family itself? Which families are currently in the ascendancy? Are any of the key families at serious odds with the Tolberts and their important allies? (C)

6. Periodic reports on the current status and attitudes of the Americo-Liberian elite would be most useful. (C)

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LIBYA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. The planned merger with the Arab Republic of Egypt will presumably alter the governmental structure of Libya, which has remained fairly stable since the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) seized power. Do individual members of the RCC feel that their positions are threatened by the prospective union? What role does President Qadhafi envision for himself in the union scheme? Has Qadhafi tried to impose his ideas on the joint Egyptian-Libyan committee which is planning the institutional structure of the prospective union? (C)

2. The planned union with Egypt has opened up Libya still more to an invasion of Egyptian advisers and job-seekers, now reported to number anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000. How many Egyptians are there in Libya? How are they integrated into the Libyan military? Are the Egyptian advisers in the Libyan Government directly subordinate to Libyan superiors, or do they remain essentially responsible to their own government? (S)

3. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has made many promises to ameliorate the lot of the Libyans and has sought many bids on projects that should ultimately improve Libyan conditions. How much improvement is there in working conditions, living conditions, medical assistance, and education; how has the change--or lack of it--influenced popular attitudes toward the RCC regime? (C)

4. The Libyan military is the principal prop of the RCC and presumably has some influence over the regime's policies. What is the military's attitude toward union with Egypt, and how do Libyan officers regard the influx of Egyptian advisers into the military? Which RCC members have influence within the military? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. In the last several months, President Qadhafi has placed major emphasis on the fedayeen as the primary combatant against Israel. Does he now feel that the occupied territories and the Palestinian cause are separate issues to be solved separately, or is he convinced that the inability of Arab governments to join in the "battle of destiny" leaves the fedayeen as the only hope in the struggle against Israel? (S)

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LIBYA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. President Qadhafi publicly is maintaining his vehement anticommunism, but he recently has demonstrated a greater willingness to trade with the USSR and has shown some initial interest in establishing relations with China. Has Qadhafi's disillusionment with Western attitudes toward the Arab-Israel conflict caused him to soften his position toward Communist countries, or has the recent detente between East and West brought about a change in the Libyan concept of nonalignment? Has Egypt played any role in changing the Libyan attitude toward the USSR? (S)

3. Libya continues to pursue its policy of supporting Muslim regimes and aiding Muslim insurgencies, despite Egyptian reluctance to go along with such ventures as the military airlift to Ugandan President Idi Amin. Will President Qadhafi be willing to compromise on such policies in the event that union with Egypt is achieved? How much influence does Qadhafi have over Sadat in the area of foreign policy? (S)

S E C R E T

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MALAGASY REPUBLIC

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. The student-teacher-worker-unemployed youth coalition is the best organized pressure group on the island. How is it organized? Who are its leaders? What policies have its strongest support? What differences exist within and among its component groups? Is there a core of radical manipulators within the coalition? What is the status of student-teacher-worker support for the Government? (C)

2. Outward popular support for General Ramanantsoa was shown by the overwhelming vote giving him a 5-year mandate. How solid is this support, especially in the various provinces and among cottiers? What role will political parties play in politics? (U)

3. Ramanantsoa has committed the Government to significant changes in Malagasy society. Which reforms have priority? Does the Government have the capacity to carry out the various proposed reforms? (C)

4. The military-civilian government maintains an outward show of unity. What conflicts and personality clashes are evident within the hierarchy? Is there serious jockeying for position? How are decisions made within the Council of Ministers? Which ministers have the most influence? How strong is the Central Government's control over the provincial and local government organs? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Foreign Minister Ratsiraka has initiated a bold redirection of foreign policy. Are his actions fully supported by other members of the Government, especially Ramanantsoa? What additional openings toward Communist countries are likely? What specific measures are being taken to strengthen relations with African countries? What considerations motivate changes in foreign policy? (S)

2. The Government is preparing to seek revisions in the cooperation agreements with France. What is the status of the Government's proposals? In what direction are French-Malagasy relations evolving? What is the level of French influence on the Government? (C)

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MALAGASY REPUBLIC

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. What changes in the organization of the security services are being carried out by the Ramanantsoa government? How competent are the forces, and what is their manpower levels? How loyal are they to the Government? How many French advisers remain? Do they have command responsibilities? (C)

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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MALAWI

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Probably the most important long-term question regarding Malawi is that of President Banda's eventual successor. Banda's personal style of governing has precluded the development of potential successors. Are there any indications that any individual is attempting to set himself up as a possible successor or that any group within the Government is considering a possible successor? Is any person or group, such as the army, making plans contingent on Banda's demise? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Several of Banda's diplomatic overtures during the latter part of 1972 apparently were intended to offset his reputation for collaboration with the white regimes in southern Africa and also to lessen his actual dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Among such overtures were an agreement with the United Kingdom in July 1972 for increased military assistance, several pronouncements emphasizing the thawing in Malawi's relations with Tanzania and Zambia, and Banda's hosting of the October 1972 meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association--particularly his carefully tempered explanations of his "dialog" with South Africa. Are there further indications that Banda is attempting to maintain a genuinely evenhanded policy despite Malawi's economic dependence on South Africa and Mozambique? Most significant would be indications of how Banda intends to cope with the conflicting pressures involved in such a policy, especially any shifts in his dealings with Mozambique nationalists. (S)

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MALI

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What contacts exist between labor and leftwing students and teachers? What is the likelihood that they could or would combine into an effective opposition to continued military rule? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The area of greatest interest over the long term is Franco-Malian relations, specifically the willingness of Paris to continue its financing of the Malian Government. How is this support translated into French leverage on the Malian Government, and in what political areas do the French seek to exercise this leverage? (C)

2. Communist Chinese activities in Mali also are of interest, particularly with regard to the Manantali Dam. How many Chinese technicians in Mali are connected with the dam, and how serious is Peking about financing the project? (S)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. In addition to our interest in signs of disunity within the army, we would appreciate continued reporting on the specific command responsibilities of members of the Military Committee of National Liberation (MCNL), particularly identification of those who retain command of combat troops. (C)

S E C R E T

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MAURITANIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. The ruling Mauritanian People's Party (PPM) is preparing to integrate the national labor organization into its ranks. What is the level of union opposition to this move? (C)

2. President Ould Daddah's regime has experienced serious student dissent. Is the regime taking action to prevent the further alienation of its youth? (U)

3. As in most African countries, Mauritania's leaders are attempting to develop a national consciousness among the people, above local and tribal loyalties. How successful have they been so far? How effective is the PPM as a mechanism for developing national loyalties? How potent are local and tribal loyalties as factors in politics? (U)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The Chinese have extended substantial aid to Mauritania. Is Chinese assistance increasing or diminishing? Is the Government satisfied with the Chinese activities? (S)

2. The Government is preparing to revise the co-operation agreements with France. What specific changes will be made? In what other respects are relations with France evolving? What other changes in foreign policy are being carried out? (C)

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MAURITIUS

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Emergency powers invoked in December 1971 permitted the Government to proscribe the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM). What resources does the MMM have on which to base a comeback if the emergency is lifted? (C)
2. The coalition government recognizes its unpopularity and is manipulating the electoral system and considering constitutional changes in an attempt to preserve its position. What specific proposals are under consideration? What dissident elements are likely to oppose the Government on these policies? How much unity is there among the coalition parties? What changes are likely if Finance Minister Ringadoo replaces Prime Minister Ramgoolam? (C)
3. Wage increases have not ended completely labor unrest. Which labor organizations are most dissatisfied, and what are their demands? What are the other major sources of discontent with governmental policies? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. A Chinese Ambassador arrived in late 1972, and negotiations are continuing with the Chinese on the implementation of the Chinese aid program. What differences are there between the two sides? How much contact is there between the Chinese Embassy and the local Chinese community? (S)
2. What are the activities of the Soviet Embassy staff, and which Mauritian politicians are in frequent contact with the Embassy? What liaison is maintained with students who have returned from the USSR, and what roles are the returnees playing in politics and in the administration of the Government? (S)
3. The Government is not entirely satisfied with British aid. What policies are in dispute? (C)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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MOROCCO

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A second attempt at regicide on 16 August 1972 on the part of the Armed Forces has pointed up the fragility of King Hassan's base of support. (C)

1. What policies does the King plan to pursue? Does he plan to hold elections within the near future? Who are his principal collaborators? How does he plan to overcome the antipathy of the armed services? (C)

2. What is the numerical strength of the various political parties and groups? Where does their strength lie? Who are the second echelon leaders? What programs of action do they have? (C)

3. What is the status of the Regency Council? (C)

4. Is the King's brother, Moulay Abdallah, attempting to establish a power base of his own? What are the potential sources of support for Abdallah? Is he likely to attempt to usurp power? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Although Morocco has apparently abandoned, or at least shelved, its claims to southwestern Algeria and Mauritania, it still covets Spanish Sahara. (U)

1. How are relations with Spain evolving vis-a-vis Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara? Has a deal been worked out with Mauritania for a division of the Spanish Sahara? (S)

2. What steps, if any, are being taken to demarcate the Algeria-Morocco border in the northern Sahara? (S)

3. How are Morocco's relations with France, the United States, and the USSR evolving? (S)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

With the death of General Oufkir and the assumption of direct control by the King, a completely revamped military organization is expected to emerge. (C)

S E C R E T

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MOROCCO

MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)

1. How are the military forces being reorganized? (C)
2. What are the ethnic backgrounds of officers of field-grade level? To what tribes or extended families do they belong? What cliques are developing among the officers? (S)
3. How politically active are the officers who have retired since 16 August? What controls are maintained over them, or what surveillance is conducted over their activities? (C)
4. Provide information on any contacts and/or affinity between Moroccan officers and their counterparts in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and the Arab Republic of Egypt. (C)

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MOZAMBIQUE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

We appreciate the high level of current reporting maintained in spite of the difficulties in obtaining accurate information. (C)

1. What are the plans, sources of aid, size of membership and field strength, and rivalries within the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO)? (C)

2. How strong is support within FRELIMO for President Samora Machel? Do any factions in FRELIMO prefer other leaders, such as Vice President Marcelino dos Santos? (C)

3. How much area and population does FRELIMO influence or control? What is the attitude of the local population in such areas? What tribal groups cooperate with or oppose FRELIMO in the Tete District? (C)

4. How much and what kinds of assistance per annum are Moscow and Peking giving FRELIMO? (C)

5. The implementing statute that defines Mozambique's relationship with Lisbon should be promulgated in early 1973. Does the statute alter in any way Lisbon's fundamental control of Mozambique's affairs? Does it provide for decentralization of administrative and financial decision-making without altering the basic political relationship? Are officials in Mozambique taking advantage of the statute to foster greater local responsibility? (C)

6. How are local administrations implementing Lisbon's policies aimed at improving the lot of Africans? What is the status of the expanded social, educational, and economic programs for the Africans? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Has Lusaka taken any steps to restrict nationalist activities in view of Portuguese political leverage that threatens the use of access routes vital to the Zambian economy? If so, how are such restrictions enforced? (S)

25X6


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MOZAMBIQUE

25X6

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)



3. What is the extent of cooperation with Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa? How much support have these countries furnished for the Portuguese counterinsurgency effort? (S)

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NIGER

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

President Diori, a capable and moderate leader, heads a single-party state; there is no significant opposition to his rule. (U)

1. How much dissatisfaction with the regime exists among the young educated Niger elite? Is the Government still capable of absorbing a number of them upon graduation? Has the recent addition of several younger men to the Cabinet made any difference in policymaking? (C)

2. What is the relationship between the party hierarchy, the administrative authorities, and the traditional aristocracy? (C)

3. What is the status of Hausa discontent with Djerma dominance? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. Are there any politically ambitious officers within the army? (C)

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NIGERIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What procedures have been initiated for taking the census scheduled for 1973? (U)
2. What reorganization and reequipment programs are taking place in the army? Do any of the three division commanders have political ambitions? (S)
3. What will be the long-range effect of local government changes, especially in the north and east? (C)
4. What new leadership is emerging in the north and east? (C)
5. What political alignments are shaping up within the six northern states, between the north and east, and in the west? (C)
6. What politicians are going after a national constituency? (C)
7. What is the organization and plans of the ex-Action Group? (C)
8. Continue reporting on the efforts of top civil servants, commissioners, and/or military officers to establish or retain political bases for themselves in anticipation of a possible return to civilian government. (C)
9. What kind of Constitution is under consideration? How will it settle the key question of Federal-state relations and the allocation of revenues? (C)
10. What further measures reflecting economic nationalism can be expected in domestic policy? (C)

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PORTUGUESE GUINEA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Amilcar Cabral has often referred to his plans for establishing a representative government on Portuguese Guinean soil. Provide any details as to timing procedure, and evidence of the possibility that such a proclamation would be accompanied by dramatic military action. (S)

2. What is the state of Cabral's health? (U)

3. It is most difficult to measure the claims of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) and the Portuguese with respect to the military situation because of the lack of direct third-party observation. We, therefore, would like as much reporting on the fighting as possible; which side has the initiative and how much, what parts of the province are under rebel administration, and has the military effort by the rebels weakened during the past 2 or 3 years? (S)

4. It appears to us that, in effect, General Spínola is transforming the rebellion into a civil war by successfully exploiting the longstanding animosities between Portuguese Guinea's Muslim and animist tribes. General Spínola's increased reliance on black African troops is also a subject of interest. How many African troops are being used in Portuguese Guinea--in what areas? What is their effectiveness? (S)

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RHODESIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Some observers believe that the Rhodesians probably are more disposed to a settlement now because of economic problems--foreign exchange shortage, declining mineral prices, growing African unemployment, and the drain on Rhodesia's reservoir of skilled technicians and managers. How severe are these problems, and how serious does the Smith government consider them? (S)

2. In late 1972, there were various indications that the Smith government was increasingly concerned over long-range threats to its security posed by the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO). White Rhodesians apparently fear that FRELIMO guerrillas may be growing strong enough to lend significant support to black Rhodesian nationalists by opening new infiltration routes along the Mozambique-Rhodesia border or by eventually attacking the rail and road routes from Umtali, Rhodesia, to the port of Beira on the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Smith has responded to these fears in two apparently conflicting ways. First, he has made such militant gestures as threatening reprisal against Zambia for harboring black Rhodesian terrorists and proffering closer collaboration with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique. Second, he reportedly told a closed session of the Rhodesian Front party congress that long-range security problems make it imperative for white Rhodesians to reach a settlement with the United Kingdom and also to refrain from provoking black Rhodesians who are not yet revolutionists. How is Smith attempting to resolve the conflicting pressures to lash back at black nationalists or to come to terms with those who are not yet revolutionists? Are there further indications that the FRELIMO threat is pushing Smith toward a settlement with the United Kingdom or toward measures which would preclude a settlement? What are the indications that white Rhodesians approve or disapprove of Smith's responses to the FRELIMO threat? (C)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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RWANDA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Although Gregoire Kayibanda has been President since October 1961, he remains a shadowy figure both as an individual and a head of state. What are Kayibanda's personal characteristics and motivations? What are his relations with the men around him? Who holds his confidence and influences him? Does he have any political opposition within the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU)? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. Are there any signs of unrest within Rwanda's political or social institutions because of President Kayibanda's long tenure? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Rwanda's relations with the Republic of Burundi and Uganda have been severely strained since late summer 1972. What actions is the Government likely to take to ease relations? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. What is the Government planning to do in order to foster improved relations with Zaire? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. What, if anything, is the Government doing to insure that the Chinese do not become involved in internal politics in Rwanda? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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SENEGAL

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Are there any nascent groups of young civil servants likely to become politically powerful in the near future? If so, who would be the leaders of such groups, and what would be the groups' goals? If not, what factors inhibit the formation of such groups, and what power base do they rely on? (C)

2. Are there any groups capable of or interested in staging a coup? Who are the leaders of such groups, and what is their present status? What is the present status of the various outlawed dissident groups such as the Provisional Student Committee, the Committee for Prolonged Revolutionary Action, and the African Independence Party? (C)

3. How much of a threat is posed by student dissidence at the University of Dakar and Senegal's lycees to the Senghor regime? (C)

4. Who would be likely to take power if President Senghor were to die in office, retire, or be assassinated? (C)

5. How important is Prime Minister Diouf within the Government? Are any Cabinet members or high-level officials more loyal to him than to Senghor? (S)

6. How successful has President Senghor been in revitalizing the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) by expanding membership, strengthening organization, and finding competent leaders? (C)

7. What is likely to be the future role of the Muslim brotherhoods in Senegalese politics? What trends toward progressive politics or antiregime politics within the brotherhoods are evident? Which marabouts, if any, might be likely to establish a political force outside the present structure? Are the Muslim leaders likely to cause Senghor trouble in the upcoming elections; if so, how? (C)

8. Is foreign aid and investment likely to increase, stabilize at present levels, or decrease during the next decade? What will be the effect on the economy in the event either aid or investment decreases, and what plans, if any, has the Government taken to meet this contingency? (U)

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SENEGAL

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

9. What is the forecast for continued rural migration to the urban areas; is it likely to increase, stabilize at current levels, or decrease? What, if any, are the Government's plans for slowing such migration? (U)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Senegal recently has recognized several Communist governments, and Senghor has taken an active role in pushing the recognition of Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile in the United Nations and with other African states. To what extent do these activities indicate a change or reorientation of Senegal's foreign policy? (S)

2. Are there any indications that Senghor may be interested in renegotiating the basic accords with France as is Niger. Is there any pressure to do so from other members of the Government? (S)

3. As President of the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), Senghor frequently has expressed his desire to see the anglophone states join the francophone states in some form of economic grouping. How committed to this policy is Senghor, given some French resistance? What is he actively doing to bring such a grouping about? (C)

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SIERRA LEONE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Although President Stevens' position seems stronger now than in early 1971, it appears to be based increasingly on force of arms rather than public support. Has he made any progress in building the All People's Congress (APC) party into a nationwide political instrument? What inroads have been made in the south, the traditional stronghold of the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)? Does the APC have a viable local party organization anywhere in the country? Is the idea of a Temne-based rival party dead? (C)

2. What are the political views of Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tarawalli? Is he loyal to Colonel Momoh and Stevens, and does he seem to possess the leadership and personal qualities required to lead a coup? How is he regarded by the rank and file? (C)

3. Periodic reporting on the "People's Militia," which totaled some 300 members in early October 1971, and on the special Internal Security Unit (ISU) would be useful. What is the size and effectiveness of each force, and how are they regarded by the regular army? (C)

4. It appears to us that President Stevens wants a one-party state system, despite his denials. Do you see a pattern developing as to how he will achieve his aim? Who within the APC is pushing hardest for a one-party state, and who will oppose? Will there be anything like a Creole position? (C)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. The military government continues to be marked by heavily veiled plotting, rivalries, and political maneuvering. President Siad, however, appears to have tightened his grip on the Government. How secure is General Siad's position? To what extent does he exercise authority over the ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)? (C)

2. Vice President Samantar appears to have been stripped of much of his powers. What is his role in the SRC? (C) Is he able to challenge Siad? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. An aid pact signed with the People's Republic of China provides for several projects and the introduction of up to 15,000 Chinese laborers and technicians to work on the projects. How many laborers and technicians have arrived? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2. Have the Soviets been able to maintain their considerable influence with the military government? (S) Is Chinese influence growing at the expense of the Soviets? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. What was discussed by General Siad and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Sellassie during the June 1972 meeting and any subsequent meetings? What is the personal relationship between the two leaders? What is the state of relations between the Somali Democratic Republic and Ethiopia? (C)

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. How much does Vorster involve himself in policy and decisionmaking at the ministerial level? Who are his key advisers, and do they change depending upon the topic under consideration? Who are Vorster's closest associates, and who are his friends? (C)
2. What following does Vorster and his clique have within the National Party? If a referendum were held soon, what percentage of the party would remain faithful to Vorster? What pressures and incentives does Vorster utilize to get party leaders to follow his bidding? (C)
3. How is Vorster's health? We had reports several years ago that he suffers from low blood pressure. Does he intend to stay on as Prime Minister until removed by ill health or death? (C)
4. Are relations between the intelligence services, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the Security Branch (SB) of the South African Police, and the Military Intelligence Unit (MI), improving since their low point in 1969-70? Are there signs that the principal individuals commanding these services have overcome their personal animosity, or are relations maintained on bureaucratic levels only? (S)
5. Do the black militant groups have any plans to get into political action? How large and how militant is the hard core of these groups? (U)
6. What has happened to the Herstigte National Party (HNP)? How large is its following, what is its financial status, and what is its expected lifespan? (C)
7. Report on progress of the Bantustans, and especially note any boundary changes, new administrative changes, and major inputs of money and administrative talent by the South African Government. (C)
8. Are there signs of rivalry or personal jealousy among the top Bantustan leaders? We are thinking primarily of Buthelezi, Matanzima, and Mangope? Do any (or all) harbor desires to become the sole spokesman for all non-whites in South Africa? (C)

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

9. What are the white students thinking? Are there signs that this group is being swayed by the worldwide student militant movement? Is there much significant difference between Afrikaner and English students? (U)

10. We see once-a-year signs that the African National Congress (ANC) still exists in South Africa as an underground movement, but we have seen nothing to indicate that the Pan-African Congress (PAC) still exists. Does it? What is your estimate of the size and capabilities of the ANC and PAC undergrounds? Do they have much contact with their respective exile groups? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What is the Government's attitude toward the United Nations (UN) and the importance of maintaining UN membership, particularly since the expulsion of Taiwan? (U)

2. What is the extent of cooperation (military and intelligence) between South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal? (S)

3. What kind of assistance is South Africa willing to grant to black African states in return for recognition? What would be in it for South Africa, aside from gaining international status? (C)

4. How is the United Kingdom's move into the European Common Market going to affect relations with South Africa? Report on all indications of new arms and equipment deals with South Africa? (C)

5. Report on French arms and equipment deals with South Africa. (C)

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SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What does the Republic of South Africa have in terms of a military presence in the Caprivi Strip--how much equipment and arms and how many camps and men? How often do they go on patrols, and where? (S)
2. What is the South African Government's assessment of the present signs of black discontent in South-West Africa? Is the level of discontent really on the increase, or is there simply an increase in the reporting from South-West Africa following the June 1971 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision and accompanying increased international awareness of the area? Is it possible that dissident groups have not really changed their attitude much but are acting up more at this time to take advantage of this increased international awareness? (C)
3. As in the Republic of South Africa, we sometimes find ourselves out of date with regard to Bantustan development. What advances are being made? What incentives is the South African Government offering to get the nonwhites to move into the Bantustans? Are there any good maps showing Bantustan boundaries? (C)

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SPANISH SAHARA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Little information is available on the internal politics of the Spanish-administered areas. (U)

1. Who is the ranking Spanish administrator? How large an administrative organization assists him? What advisory councils or bodies are employed? How are they selected, what are their functions, and how extensive is their influence? (C)

2. What police or security forces are employed? Who are their commanders? How large are the forces? (S)

3. What opposition or subversive organizations exist in Spanish Sahara? Who are the leaders, and what is their tribal affiliation? What is the source and the amount of any foreign assistance? (S)

4. What are Spain's policies relative to the travel of foreigners to Spanish Sahara? (S)

5. What are Spain's policies regarding self-government for any of these areas? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. How large a military establishment is maintained in each area? Who are the commanding officers? To whom (or what) is each subordinate? (S)

2. In Spanish Sahara, are the natives conscripted? If so, what is the duration of such service? What type of training is given? (C)

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SUDAN

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What changes has the revolutionary government imposed on the structure of the Central Government? Are the ministries still organized according to the British pattern? Assess the competence and morale of the civil service. How do the duties and responsibilities of a minister of state differ from those of a Cabinet minister? List the republican orders and decrees under which the Government operates. Interpretive reporting will be needed on the permanent Constitution and the National Charter which are expected to be promulgated in 1973. What role will the newly formed Sudan Socialist Union play, if any, in the formulation of policy? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Since the July 1971 coup, Numayri has placed less public emphasis on Sudan's commitment to the Arab fight with Israel and has tried to reestablish Sudan's African credentials. To what extent will Numayri cooperate with Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, and Zaire in removing irritants in relations? Is Numayri prepared to take measures to deny Sudanese territory for use as a safe haven to rebels from neighboring countries? To what extent will Sudan become immersed in sub-Saharan problems? (C)

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SWAZILAND

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Swaziland became independent from the United Kingdom on 6 September 1968. Power is firmly in the hands of the country's traditional rulers, who govern through the Imbokodvo political movement and the traditional Swazi National Council. The ruling oligarchy is opposed by some ineffectually led urban groups. Nevertheless, there are potential challenges to the present rulers, notably from modernists and educated youth within the Imbokodvo itself. A difficult, but not insurmountable, challenge for the ruling group will be to maintain its power in the face of increasing modernization in the economy and in the political life of the country, while at the same time providing the kind of administration which will foster progress in the country's potentially viable economy. (C)

1. Who are the principle advisers and confidants of the ruler, King Sobhuza II? How much does he rely on the small informal privy council for advice? Is the king becoming more involved in the constitutional affairs of state as opposed to "Swazi Nation" affairs? (S)

2. How much contact or cooperation is there between the whites and the ruling Swazi traditionalists? (C)

3. Will Swaziland become a one-party state? What is the status of the small nationalist parties? What is likely to happen to them if the Government adopts a single-party system? To what degree has the organization and activities of the primary opposition, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), been maintained despite the imprisonment, exile, or defection to the Imbokodvo of many of its leaders? What assistance does the NNLC receive from non-Swazi sources, Communist, or radical African states? (C)

4. How much is Swaziland used as a haven and way station for South African political refugees? What governmental restrictions are there on the activities of refugees? What assistance do other African states give these groups? (S)

5. What conflicts and maneuvers for power are going on between modernist and traditionalist elements within the Imbokodvo? How successful has the Imbokodvo been in winning the allegiance of trade unions, civil servants, teachers, students, etc.? (S)

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SWAZILAND

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

6. Is there any maneuvering among potential successors to King Sobhuza II? Is there any desire among politically significant groups to reduce the political powers of future kings? (C)

7. What conflicts are there between the Swazi National Council and the Imbokodvo government? (C)

8. What are the implications and likely consequences of basic policy shifts in land tenure, mineral rights, etc.? (C)

9. What is the personal prestige of Prime Minister Makhosini Dlamini? Who are his possible successors? (C)

10. What are the significant activities of Simon Sishayi Nxumalo, Minister of Industry, Mines, and Tourism? Is there any loosening of his close relationship with the Prime Minister? (C)

11. Continue reporting on Swazi attitudes toward regional cooperation, especially with regard to such institutions as the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland and the Regional Testing Center. (U)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What contacts are there between the Swazi ruling elements and other black African states? What is the status of the Swaziland Government's relations with the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique? To what degree does Swaziland try to limit its relations with its white-ruled neighbors? (C)

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TANZANIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. The Peoples Militia apparently has not turned out to be the serious rival to the army that many observers feared. We would still like to be kept informed of its activities, particularly if the Chinese become involved in its training program. (S)

2. We would appreciate continued reporting on the Ujamaa village program and Nyerere's decentralization program. Has there been any progress in the implementation of Nyerere's educational ideas? Have there been any significant changes at the University of Dar es Salaam--a school Nyerere once, in effect, accused of breeding elitist attitudes? (C)

3. In the wake of Amin's expulsion of the Asian community from Uganda, have Tanzania's remaining Asians become more restive? Do the Asians still control any significant portion of the economy other than perhaps the retail trade? How many Asians are still in Tanzania? How badly have services and the economy, in general, deteriorated since the 1971 exodus? (C)

4. Many mainlanders seemed to have admired Karume despite his crude ways. How do they feel about his successor, Aboud Jumbe? Who would you say are Jumbe's main associates? What has become of Himidi? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. How deeply committed do you think Nyerere remains to the East African Community? (C)

2. How much and what kinds of assistance per annum are Moscow and Peking giving the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)? (C)

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TOGO

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

President Brigadier General Eyadema, who seized power in a coup in April 1967, heads a single-party state in which the military wield power. (C)

1. What steps has Eyadema taken to consolidate his power? (C)

2. Has there been any real movement toward constitutionalization of the regime? (C)

3. Are there ambitious military officers who would like to oust Eyadema? Are there any other potential challenges to Eyadema's control of the party? (S)

4. What political influence will student radicals have in the foreseeable future? (C)

5. Will growing resentment against foreign small traders eventually lead to their expulsion? (C)

6. Has Eyadema had any success in winning southerners to his side? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Now that Togo has recognized Peking, can any changes be expected in Togolese foreign policy; if so, in which direction? Which Government officials are pro-Chinese, if any? (C)

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TUNISIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

As the Tunisian Government and the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) prepare for the inevitable post-Bourguiba period, there is considerable jockeying for position among the rival factions and personalities. The 1971 PSD congress showed that there is strong popular support for a more democratic and less authoritarian system, although there was a consensus for retaining a strong Presidency. Meanwhile, President Bourguiba still is very much in command, despite failing health and strength. Prime Minister Nourira may also be moving toward liberalizing the regime. (C)

1. What changes are being made in governmental and party procedures toward more democratic systems? How are these changes effected? (C)

2. How much power has President Bourguiba delegated to Prime Minister Nourira? What, if any, elements are attempting to undermine the Prime Minister? What is the Prime Minister's relationship with the more prominent liberals, such as Bahi Ladgham, Ahmed Mestiri, and Hassib ben Ammar? Where does the President's wife, Wassila Bourguiba (Ben Ammar), fit into the political picture? (S)

3. What is the political complexion of each minister, his relative standing within the contending factions, his relationship with Prime Minister Nourira, and the extent and source of his political influence? (C)

4. Nourira has told the US Ambassador that a constitutional amendment increasing the powers of the National Assembly will be submitted to the assembly in late 1972. What is the status of the other amendments drafted in 1970, submitted to the National Assembly in February 1971, and considered by the PSD congress? (C)

5. How are the factions within the National Assembly aligned? What issues are brought before the assembly? (C)

6. How are the factions evolving within the PSD? Who are the 26 regional representatives to the Central Committee; how and when are they selected? Has Mestiri's

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TUNISIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

position been strengthened or diminished by the sending of a letter to President Bourguiba advocating implementation of the reforms approved by the PSD congress? What other actions will he take to further the reformists' cause? (C)

7. How active politically is Bahi Ladgham? What are his political resources? Is he likely to make a bid for power when Bourguiba dies or in 1974? (S)

8. What dissident Tunisian organizations exist? Who are their leaders, how much support do they have within Tunisia, and how are they financed? (S)

9. What changes are being made in the police and security forces? Who are the responsible officials? What is their political complexion? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. How are relations with Algeria evolving? (C)

2. How are relations with Libya developing? (C)

3. What are Foreign Minister Masmoudi's plans for securing Tunisian and other Arab states' participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. In the event of a struggle for power between contending political factions, how would the military forces be aligned? (S)

2. How are the Armed Forces being reorganized? (S)

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.NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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UGANDA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. General Amin ousted ex-President Obote in January 1971. Since then, Amin has made vague statements about elections and a return to a civilian government. What are Amin's intentions with respect to a return to a civilian rule? Under what conditions would he agree to hold elections? (C)
2. Amin continues to travel widely over the country talking to various tribal groups and leaders. How strong is Amin's grassroots support? Are there any signs of disenchantment with his failure to remain in the capital and seriously attempt to resolve the country's many problems? (S)
3. Amin raised and then dashed the hopes of the Baganda, Uganda's largest tribe, that their traditional kingdom would be restored. Is there any evidence of significant Baganda resentment or opposition to Amin as a result of his actions? (S)
4. General Amin has surrounded himself with a number of military colleagues who appear to have considerable influence with him. The Defense Council is one of the groups on which Amin relies. Who are the members of this group, what is the extent of their influence, and what is their role in forming domestic and foreign policy? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
5. Uganda's normally conservative students have disagreed openly with Amin on some important issues. He has responded by banning the leading student organization and announcing that students will undergo military training and that army and police officers will supervise student organization elections. Is there any evidence of organized student opposition to the regime? (C) If so, who are the leaders of this opposition? (S)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Amin has developed closer ties with the USSR, the People's Republic of China, and other Communist countries. Is there any indication that his moves are more than just an effort to seek badly needed aid and additional markets for Ugandan agricultural exports? (S)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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UGANDA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

2. Deteriorating relations between Uganda and Tanzania have strained the East African Community and given rise to rumors that Amin is seeking closer ties to Zaire, the Somali Democratic Republic, and other African countries. Is there any evidence that Amin is attempting to establish such ties? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

3. Amin has developed close relations with the Arab world. Does he intend to emphasize Uganda's Arab ties at the expense of its position in Africa? What is the nature of domestic reaction to Amin's pro-Arab moves? (C)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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15 December 1972--14 December 1973

UPPER VOLTA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Upper Volta will have a transitional government for the next 3 years, headed by General Lamizana, in which military officers will hold one-third of the Cabinet posts. (U)

1. Are there younger army elements who have acquired a taste for the perquisites and exercise of political power and might be tempted to move against Lamizana? (C)
2. Are there radical elements within the army? (C)
3. How important will the new National Assembly be? (C)
4. Are economic grievances such that they can be expected to spark serious strikes over the next few years? (C)
5. Will Upper Voltan political affiliations continue to be tribally and geographically based for the foreseeable future? (C)
6. Has Gerard Kango Ouedraogo's program of social reform generated opposition from traditional leaders? (C)
7. Have there been any moves toward lessening French influence on the economy? (C)
8. How close is the relation between the ruling Upper Voltan political party and the ruling party of the Ivory Coast? (C)
9. What steps are being taken to prepare the country for a return to fully representative government? (C)

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S E C R E T

Africa IRG-Af-1972
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ZAIRE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. What is the continuing impact of President Mobutu Sese Seko's drive to reorganize the Central Government and the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR)? How is it affecting governmental and party operations in the central and local levels? (S)
2. What Government officials appear to be popular or influential with President Mobutu? To what extent does he delegate responsibility to key individuals or rely on individuals for advice in particular areas of expertise? (S)
3. What is the continuing impact of Mobutu's drive to integrate the labor union, the church, and the army into the MPR? (S)
4. What is Mobutu's personal relationship with the Catholic Church since his dispute with Cardinal Malula? (C)
5. What is the continuing impact on Zairian university students of their induction into the army in June 1971 and the subsequent reorganization of Zairian universities? (C)
6. What are the current strength and capabilities of rebel bands in eastern Zaire? To what extent have army counterinsurgency operations in this area resulted in alienating local inhabitants and increasing their susceptibility to subversive movements? (S)
7. Are tighter controls on governmental expenditures and reorganization programs causing resentment among significant numbers of personnel who lose jobs or undergo reductions in income? Are increases in the cost of living causing significant unrest in Kinshasa or other urban areas? (U)
8. Are there any signs of increasing tensions between the Central Government and local areas, such as Kivu, which feel that Kinshasa is neglecting regional development? (S)

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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ZAIRE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. What long-range plans does President Mobutu have for improving relations with radical African states such as Guinea and Algeria? How does he plan to assume a leading role in African affairs? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. What future contacts does Mobutu plan with the USSR? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. What is Mobutu's current attitude toward Zaire's reconciliation with the Congo? (S)
4. What is the current relationship between Mobutu and Holden Roberto, President of the Angolan Revolutionary Government-in-exile (GRAE)? Is Mobutu seriously seeking reconciliation between the GRAE and the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)? (S)
5. What is the actual extent of collaboration between Zairian officials and Portuguese authorities in Angola? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
6. Are there any indications that Mobutu intends to expel more alien residents, tighten control measures on alien commercial activities, or intensify propaganda attacks on aliens? Continuing reporting is especially useful on Belgian businessmen in Zaire, the treatment they receive from Zairian officials, and their ability to solicit official Belgian support when Zairian governmental measures impinge on their interests. (C)
7. What is the continuing status of Zaire's relations with Belgium? (S)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. What is the continuing impact of President Mobutu's army reshuffle of summer 1972? What is the status of Mobutu's relationship with Captain General Bumba and other senior officers? (S)
2. What is the continuing impact of Mobutu's efforts to strengthen army discipline? Are his measures causing any morale problems throughout the army? Is Mobutu considering any further major reforms within the Military Establishment? (S)

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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ZAMBIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Information is needed particularly on factionalism within the United National Independence Party (UNIP). What are the aims and the strengths of tribal-based political activity? To what extent do nontribal factors--i.e., race, generational differences, rural divisions, urban divisions, economic interests, and personal ambitions--influence political alignments in and out of the UNIP? How organized are political groupings? What are their strengths and weaknesses? To whom do they give allegiance? (C)

2. Assess President Kaunda's role in calming factionalism. How successful are party and governmental policies aimed at steering the energies of domestic groups, including labor and youth, into constructive channels? What is the effect of factionalism and Kaunda's response on his political and personal position? (C)

3. What are the political consequences of Zambia becoming a one-party state? Has the step facilitated Kaunda's efforts to check the disruptive effects of tribalism and other social divisions, or has imposition of the new system only further alienated those tribal groups that supported opposition parties? How have apolitical, educated Zambians who fill important positions in the civil service and economy reacted to the move? Has a one-party system resulted in the often poorly educated party leaders having a greater influence on national policy? Is Kaunda willing or able to clamp down on poorly disciplined or personally ambitious members of UNIP cadre at the branch and section levels? (C)

4. What governmental or UNIP policies could disrupt domestic stability? What is Kaunda's role in formulating or accepting such policies? What about Zambianization or other policies affecting race relations, particularly in the Copper Belt? What about UNIP efforts to eliminate or control active and potential political opposition from the military, labor unions, and apolitical civil servants and businessmen? (C)

5. What is the degree of political consciousness in the security services? To what extent have tribal sympathies been aroused in these services? To what extent is there resentment against UNIP politicians or the Government's

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ZAMBIA

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

policies? How much rivalry is there between or within the services? What are the attitudes of established services toward the military aspects of the National Youth Service (NYS)? What are the Government's plans for the NYS? (C)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Are there indications of any expansion in Communist contacts or influence in Lusaka? Provide information on politically significant activities by the Soviet Embassy, the Chinese Communist Embassy, or other Communist embassies in Lusaka, including overt or covert relations with foreign nationalist groups in Zambia. What is the policy of the Zambian Government for coping with Communist political action, and how effective are Zambian countermeasures? (C)
2. Continue reporting on the foreign nationalist or insurgent groups currently operating in Zambia. What are their present organized elements, activities, capabilities, and interrelations with other nationalist or Communist groups? (C)
3. How much support is the Zambian Government giving to the military efforts of foreign resistance groups currently established in Zambia? What activities does Zambia permit or deny? How effective are Zambian restrictions? What activities do foreign groups carry on that are not sanctioned by the Zambian Government? (C)
4. Continue reporting on the Zambian Government's reaction to Rhodesian independence. Pending the completion of efforts to end economic dependence on Rhodesia, what contacts with a white-ruled Salisbury will Zambia accept, official or otherwise? What similarities and differences are there in Zambia's relationships with Rhodesia, Portugal, and the Republic of South Africa? (C)
5. Zambia's internal instability and hostility toward southern African countries make it a fertile area for political involvement by those governments. What evidences are there of southern African support of Zambian political parties and factions? Are southern African contacts with domestic Zambian opposition groups or dissidents growing? (S)

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ZAMBIA

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. Continue reporting on Zambia's changing defense policies. What is the extent and importance of the defense buildup? To what extent could new weaponry be used in offensive operations? To what extent are Italian and Yugoslav military training and equipment replacing British programs? Whom else might Zambia be turning to for military aid? (C)

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